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Quality in Action Research: Reflections for Second-Order Inquiry 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
One of the current debates in action research concerns the quality of these practices. 
Up to now, many contributions have focused on defining specific criteria based on 
action research epistemology. This article sustains (1) that prior to dealing with these 
questions, it is necessary to define for what purpose and for whom we are making the 
evaluation; (2) that this leads us to make a distinction between different evaluation 
models; and (3) that the quality strategies and criteria will be different for each model. 
In particular, the article confronts an academic evaluation model as a form of external 
control over the quality of action research and an internal, participatory evaluation 
model as a quality strategy aimed at establishing feedback for the process. Final 
considerations are given about the implications of both models for academia.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, a progressive interest has been aroused in different approaches to 
action research (AR), there has also been an increase in literature on the quality and 
validity of these practices (see Avison et al., 2001; Bradbury & Reason 2001; 
Champion & Stowell, 2003; Chandler & Torbert, 2003; Checkland & Holwell, 1998; 
Feldman, 2007; Heikkinen et al., 2007; Heron, 1996a; Hope & Waterman, 2003; 
McTaggart, 1998; Reason, 2006; Torbert, 2000; Turnock & Gibson, 2001). Many of 
these contributions have focused on establishing criteria for evaluating quality in AR. 
This text sustains that, prior to dealing with these questions, it is necessary to define for 
what purpose and for whom we are evaluating AR; that this leads us to draw a 
distinction between different evaluation models; and that the evaluation strategies and 
criteria will be different for each model.  
 
The arguments sustained in the text come from both academic reflection and practices 
associated to postgraduate studies which teams from different universities of Spain 
(Autonomous University of Barcelona; Complutense University of Madrid) have been 
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carrying out over the last decade. The methodological tradition that feeds these 
experiences and the setting around which the arguments of this article revolve is 
Participatory Action Research (Fals Borda 1994, 2001). In particular, we are talking 
about community development experiences in which participatory dialogue is the basis 
for developing community programmes (Villasante 2006; Villasante & Garrido 2001). 
The reflections contained in this article are applicable not only to these experiences, 
but more extensively to all those AR approaches in which the participants are also co-
researchers.  
 
 
2. What is quality in AR? 
 
If there is anything that current debates on quality in AR have in common, that is their 
clear wish to move away from the classic notions of scientific validity established by 
Campbell and Stanley (1963). Indeed, the same concept of “validity” is often replaced 
by others with no positivist connotations, such as trustworthiness (Stringer 2007), 
authenticity (Champion & Stowell 2003) or quality (Reason 2006), which we will use in 
this text. Others, like Anderson et al. (1994) and Heron (1996b) prefer to maintain the 
term “validity” and redefine it. 
 
While some researchers and practitioners deny the relevance of this debate, as they 
regard it to be fundamentally academic and far removed from the concerns of AR 
practitioners (in this respect, see the online discussion transcribed in Newman, 1999), 
others base their arguments on the criteria proposed for qualitative research by Lincoln 
and Guba (1985, Lincoln 1995). Watkins (1991), for example, adapts these criteria to 
AR. However, the stance of the majority is to draw an epistemological distinction 
between qualitative research and AR, and to focus on action as a key AR element. This 
is an approach that, to a large extent, has its roots in John Dewey (1941), who opposes 
the classic notion of “truth” with that of “warranted assertability” understood as 
meaningful assertions opened to ongoing inquiry, thus raising the inseparability of 
knowledge and practical experience (Kandlbinder 2004, 38). 
 
In this way, unlike the quality proposals made for qualitative research, which have 
tended to focus more on reports as a product (Feldman 2007, 22), the criteria 
introduced to AR pay special attention to the development of research practice itself, 
and among these, it is possible to distinguish a concern for at least five dimensions: 
topics (about the relevance and significance of what is discussed, and about its deep 
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understanding), participants (their diversity and extension; their relations); method 
(relations with participants and ways of knowing); consequences (defined outcomes as 
well as learning and empowerment); as well as the context in which AR takes place 
(institutions, power, interests). Behind all these dimensions it is also possible to identify 
a “meta-criterion” setting for the values, ethics and professional commitments 
(Stevenson 2002). 
 
Without aiming to be exhaustive, we could mention some of the contributions made in 
this sense. Anderson, Herr & Nihlen (1994), conserving the term validity, introduce five 
criteria for AR: outcome validity (the extent to which actions occur, which leads to the 
resolution of the problem), process validity (method and forms of relation with the 
participants), democratic validity (presence of all parties at stake), catalytic validity 
(ability of the participants to know and transform reality) and dialogic validity (review by 
others). Champion & Stowell (2003) focus on participants (their choice, the criteria for 
inclusion, and the reasons for non-involvement, or exclusion), engagement (about 
achieving commitment), authority (under which action may be taken, as it influences 
the degree of self-governance of participants), relationships (links between actors) and 
learning (reflection process and knowledge). Reason (2006), after the contributions 
made in Bradbury & Reason (2001) and considering co-operative inquiry to be more of 
a worldview than a mere research approach, introduces four sets of questions which, 
with greater or lesser intensity, deal with every AR: pursuing worthwhile purposes, 
democracy and participation, plural ways of knowing, and emergent developmental 
forms. For Heron (1996b, 158)  “the outcomes of a co-operative inquiry are valid if they 
are well-grounded in the forms of knowing –practical, propositional, presentational, 
experiential – which support them”, and proposes sets of criteria for the validation of 
practice in co-operative inquiry: executive criteria (capacity to act), technical criteria 
(effectiveness in the achievement of goals), psychosocial criteria (whether action is free 
of psychological and organizational pathologies); and moral criteria (contribution to 
transformation) (Heron 1996a, 43). 
 
Evaluating these criteria will, as in all scientific activity, require their explanation and 
critical reflection throughout the research process. In this respect, Checkland and 
Holwell (1998, 18), refer to a declared-in-advance methodology “in such a way that the 
process is recoverable by anyone interested in subjecting the research to critical 
scrutiny”. And Reason (2006, 189-190) indicates in this sense that quality must be 
based on explaining the choices made during the research: “researchers need to be 
aware of the choices open to them; to make these choices clear and transparent to 
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themselves, and to their inquiry partners”; in this respect, he discerns a double 
dimension: the internal (ability to see choices and understand their consequences) and 
the external (about how these choices are made transparent to the audience).  
 
The debate on the criteria is still open and subject to future discussions. We do not aim 
to close the debate here, not because we share the farewell to criteriology proposed by 
Schwandt (1996), but because we believe –and this is the argument that is developed 
within this text– that questions must be asked before its concretion: a debate as to 
where, for what purpose and for whom the evaluation is made. And also about who 
makes the choices, who thinks about them and to whom they are made transparent. 
The following section tackles these issues. 
 
 
3. Quality for whom and for what?  
 
There are several reasons to justify the interest in quality in AR. Partly, the need to 
consolidate these research practices in the academia as a relevant (and different) form 
of generating knowledge. Also, the wish to debate and co-construct criteria and 
working methods among researchers and practitioners working in diverse contexts and 
frameworks. Moreover, the intention to provide feedback for the AR processes 
themselves. In all cases, those of us who often write and speak about the subject are 
“professional researchers”, and we do so in academic settings, or by addressing an 
academic audience such as this. 
 
Perhaps the first question to ask ourselves is for what kind of audience we are making 
the evaluation, since notions such as “quality” or “validity” are social constructions 
(Kvale 1995), and what is constructed as “valid” in academia may not necessarily 
coincide with what is “valid” for participants, for an institution which finances AR 
projects or for a researcher. Academia –or, rather, the hegemonic scientific 
communities that “inhabit” it– is perhaps interested in classical issues of validity and 
reliability (“Is it an acceptable source of knowledge under the scientific rigour? How 
does it fit in with reality? Is it replicable?”); perhaps the second group is more interested 
in their immediate application (“does it work?”); the third group may be more 
concerned, for example, with the perception of the participants (“Please can you 
measure the satisfaction of all those who have participated in the project I have 
financed?”); for the last group, the most important aspect may be learning and the 
ability to influence that is generated by the entire process by the different actors (“what 
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about skills and empowerment?”) –which Lather (1986) and Anderson et al. (1994) 
refer to as “catalytic validity”. The debate on quality is not an analytical or technical 
question, but above all a normative and political one. 
 
Bradbury and Reason (2001, 454) say that “in participative inquiry, which has emerged 
in its fullest sense as not with people but research by people, responsibility for 
exploring these issues [about quality] will rest with the community as a whole” (and we 
could add to this argument: because it is research not only done by people, but also for 
people). That is, it lies in the very epistemological foundation of AR which, irrespective 
of the fact that “others” want to evaluate it, is also evaluated by and for participants. 
And, given that in participatory action research, the individuals/actors involved not only 
form a part of the research context, but are immersed in it, and therefore co-construct 
the research process and its results, it seems relevant for the criteria and evaluation 
methods to be co-defined in each case with the participants. 
 
Associated with “for whom” AR is evaluated is “for what purpose”. A researcher or 
practitioner may simply ask him/herself, “Am I doing a good job?”, and ask the 
participants or the academic community this same question. It is a question that is 
appropriate and necessary, for example, in being accountable to participants, or in a 
dissertation submitted to the academic community, and evokes a more “traditional” 
idea of research evaluation, research being understood as control –which Reason 
(2006, 191) calls “a form of policing research” and Kvale (1995, 36, cited in Reason, 
2006, 191), from a post-modern approach, refers to as “an expression of a modern 
legitimation mania”.  
 
However, the epistemological interest of AR is also present –above all– in other fields. 
If its horizons involve the co-generation of knowledge and promoting change in social 
practices, then the debate on “quality” is not only about “control”, but also a component 
part of the AR process that provides feedback for knowledge and action generated 
through learning. Nothing is closer to Kurt Lewin’s classic spiral design: (a) quality as a 
process of self-reflection and co-construction of knowledge –for improving theory; (b) 
quality as an ongoing improvement strategy in the management of a process –for 
improving action. In this case, we are referring to evaluation aimed at the improvement 
or transformation of practice, based on learning arising from reflection about the 
process. 
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Another purpose that may stem from evaluation is that the analysis of practices serves 
to allow them to be applied beyond the local setting under study. Methodological 
conceptualizations of this criterion involve external validity (Campbell & Stanley 1963), 
naturalistic generalization (Stake 1994), transferability (Lincoln & Guba 1985) or 
transcontextual credibility (Greenwood & Levin, 1998). Academics will often show 
interest in these issues, but not only them; participants may also be interested in 
evaluating not only the practice in which they are immersed, but also other practices, in 
order to ascertain what is working, what conflicts are being detected, what potentialities 
and threats are identified and be able to “transfer” this knowledge to their own 
practices. In these cases, the evaluation will also be required to have some form of 
transferability that enables what has been learned to be applied to other settings. 
 
We can classify this distinction between the different “whys” of evaluation (such as 
control, learning or transferable knowledge) into two dimensions, as shown in Figure 1, 
in such a way that four quadrants show different concepts of AR evaluation. 
Furthermore, each of the quadrants is usually closer to different “audiences” of the 
evaluation, or put another way, different actors tend to conceive the evaluation based 
on different purposes. In the first quadrant (A), we find forms of self-evaluation that are 
oriented towards participants that raise the question of considering quality as a 
feedback of the process itself, and without intending to generate knowledge beyond the 
local setting: the evaluation is learning “for us” and “for our practice”, and the driving 
force that transforms it. In the second quadrant (B), there are evaluations that also 
have no aim of transferability, and which understand quality as a way of controlling 
“good work” and the results thereof; these include, for example, evaluations made by 
external agencies and institutions which sometimes finance local AR projects and 
require local actors to be accountable. In the third quadrant (C) we can identify forms of 
evaluation that promote the exchange of experiences (through the analysis of “best 
practices” and similar), so that the learning arising from this analysis can be transferred 
and applied in other contexts. Lastly, in D, we find academic, external forms of 
evaluation: “quality control” in a practice –a ‘research’ practice– in order to produce 
base knowledge that is placed on a higher level of abstraction and can be applied 
beyond the local setting. Of course, we are referring to general types, and other forms 
of evaluation are possible. For example, an external evaluation may be requested by 
the actors in the local setting (for “verifying” compliance of objectives). On the contrary, 
evaluations promoted by external agencies may give priority to internal, formative types 
of evaluation.  
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 Oriented towards the practice itself 
(“inwards”) 
 
Evaluation as 
learning in 
participants 
A B Evaluation as 
control 
C D 
 Oriented towards transferability 
(“outwards”) 
 
 
Fig. 1 Purposes and concepts of evaluation 
 
In this text we will focus more specifically on two models that are situated in the first (A) 
and fourth (D) quadrants. One broaches the subject of an internal evaluation, aimed at 
providing feedback for the AR social relations process itself, and the other, on the 
contrary, refers to an “academic validation” understood as external control of a form of 
producing knowledge/action.  
 
This text sustains that, above and beyond evaluation understood as a “hallmark of 
quality”, it is important to focus on it as an opportunity to make progress in each AR 
practice, and be able to distinguish one form of evaluation from another, because even 
though they are known by the same name, they are different things. On the other hand, 
this argument does not question the need to establish forms of evaluation and quality 
criteria that make AR more “defensible and potentially transferable” (Checkland & 
Holwell 1998, 9). As a bridge between social practice and scientific activity, AR 
requires this dialogue with academia, since it feeds off its theoretical and 
methodological reflections.  
 
Figure 2 shows each model in more detail. 
 
 AR academic evaluation AR internal evaluation  
Audience  
(for whom) 
Academics, scientific 
community 
 
Participants and local actors 
 
Purpose 
(for what) 
“Quality control” 
“Outwards” evaluation 
(transferability) 
Feedback: learning, 
improvement/transformation 
“Inwards” evaluation 
What is being 
evaluated 
AR Design Social practice as a whole 
Positionality External Internal 
Orientation Result-oriented (findings) 
Ex post evaluation 
Process-oriented (social relation) 
Ongoing evaluation 
Scope Contribution to base knowledge  
Public knowledge 
Incidence in local setting 
Local knowledge and practice 
 
Fig. 2 Internal and academic model of quality evaluation in Action Research 
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The argument defended here is that these two general models have different concepts 
of quality and therefore require different approaches. The preceding sections have 
already dealt with two basic aspects of this difference (the audience and the purposes 
of the evaluation), and we will now indicate other aspects that define them –taking the 
contributions of Herr and Anderson (2005), regarding the implications of doing doctoral 
dissertations on AR projects, as a starting point. 
 
What is being evaluated: As stated by Herr & Anderson (2005, 89), one of the main 
differences between the academic analysis of an AR process and the process itself is 
that the first of these is an individual task while the second is a collective one. The 
academic evaluation is aimed at judging the knowledge process carried out by the 
researcher. And the criteria on which this judgement is made are oriented at evaluating 
the relevance of the knowledge produced in relation to the social reality being studied. 
If “anything fails” there, it is not reality but the research process, and therefore the 
researcher: “his/her” theories, “his/her” methods, “his/her” interpretations. However, in 
AR, this distinction (between the studied reality, the knowledge process and the 
researcher) is more complex: as already mentioned above, the individuals/actors 
involved not only form a part of the research context, but are in fact involved in the 
method itself, and are thus co-researchers. When evaluating an AR project “from 
inside” and “inwards”, not only is the researcher’s work being judged, but also a context 
and a social process in which the actors, situated in an action frame, design strategies 
in relation to that process: their learning, empowerment or the type of change produced 
will also depend, in particular, on them and on the conditioning factors of the setting. In 
academic evaluation, all these aspects form a part of the “context of study”, but are not 
the “object of the evaluation”: what is being evaluated in this case are the decisions 
made by the researcher(s)/practitioner(s) in a determined context, and the way in which 
these decisions contribute to tackling certain quality criteria. In short: the quality of a 
social process is not the same as the quality of research design, even if this design is 
aimed at promoting a social process.  
 
Positionality. Academic evaluation requires the “validation” of knowledge production to 
be sanctioned outside its construction process. Even in the most participatory 
approaches to research, when evaluation is defended in an academic setting (within 
the scope of a dissertation, or the double-blind review system of refereed journals), the 
distances between the “object of the evaluation”, the “defender/s” and the 
“reviewers/examiners” will be clearly marked. On the contrary, the evaluation of an AR 
process aimed at learning in terms of providing feedback for the practice itself seems 
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especially relevant for internal forms of evaluation. In these forms of evaluation, the 
roles of the “evaluator” and the “evaluated” merge, and the evaluation process is within 
the same social practice. 
 
Orientation. Academic research is aimed at producing base knowledge of a studied 
topic. A product is obtained (findings), and the process through which this is obtained is 
judged with respect to the appropriate means used to obtain that result. This approach 
clashes with AR epistemology in that (a) the social relations process produced through 
the research is just as important as the results obtained; and (b) both the process and 
the results are not only oriented at producing knowledge, but also at social practice as 
two inseparable dimensions (Herr & Anderson 2005, 86). Therefore, the aspects 
referring to the process, social relations and action may –and should– be analysed on 
the basis of academic evaluation. However, whereas an evaluation that is intended to 
provide feedback to the process “from inside” will analyse these aspects in the course 
of the process itself, academic evaluation will do so based on an ex-post orientation, 
and observing the action related to the AR design. 
 
Scope. Academics may show a certain amount of sympathy for AR when social theory 
and methodology is used as a form of local knowledge oriented at producing changes 
in local settings. However, doubts and objections emerge when this work is presented 
as a way of producing knowledge beyond the setting: AR is often seen to be something 
practitioners do, while academic researchers do basic research (McTaggart 1998, 213; 
Herr & Anderson 2005, 52). In this context, the distinction made by Cochran-Smith & 
Lytle (1993, cited in Herr and Anderson, 2005, 6) between local knowledge and public 
knowledge is useful. An AR process may be evaluated based on its capacity to face 
local challenges from the production of local knowledge. But it can also be evaluated 
based on its capacity to produce knowledge about these same issues at a higher level 
of abstraction than the analysed setting, and consequently, based on its capacity to 
produce formal theory. Both aspects are closely related, but the second case will 
require specific reflection about the transferability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) or 
transcontextual credibility (Greenwood & Levin, 1998) of these practices. 
 
 
4. Evaluating quality from second-order processes: design and criteria  
 
Elliot (1991) makes a distinction between a first-order process of AR (about social 
problems being studied) and a second-order inquiry (focused on analysing the 
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experience of facilitators, and the implications and consequences of their relations with 
others). Starting with this distinction, we understand AR evaluation as a second-order 
process that involves analysing the link between the first-order AR design and the 
social practice to which it belongs. A second-order inquiry that, as stated by Losito, 
Pozzo & Somekh (1998), not only concerns external researchers but it also applies to 
all those participants who are inside action research groups. 
 
From this approach, and based on the previous reflections, in this section we deal with 
some considerations regarding the design of both evaluation models presented. In 
each of the models, we will pay special attention to three aspects: the relationship 
between the first-order and the second-order processes; the relationships between 
participants and practitioners/researchers; and the implications of all this when defining 
the evaluation criteria. 
 
 
4.1. Academic evaluation of AR 
 
The external evaluation model, and in particular, the academic evaluation of AR may 
be expressed by returning to and adapting the schema proposed by Zuber-Skerritt and 
Fletcher (2007). Basing their reflections on the performing of action research thesis in 
social sciences, these authors make a distinction between a primary process (which 
they refer to as the core action research) and a secondary process (the performing and 
writing of an academic work on the core process). Whereas the former generates 
social relations among the participants, the latter observes ‘from outside’ the nature 
and dynamics of these relations, and evaluates them in relation to certain quality 
criteria, in order to produce a “product” of a different nature: an academic analysis 
regarding its quality.  
 
Adapting this proposal made by the foregoing authors, this idea can be expressed 
through the attached figure. The core AR constitutes the fieldwork for a second-order 
analysis that will lead to an academic evaluation. This, in turn, will validate the 
production of base knowledge about the social practices studied and provide feedback 
for further research.  
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Fig. 3 Core Action Research and Academic Evaluation 
Source: Own diagram, adapting a schema by Zuber-Skerritt & Fletcher (2007, 421) 
 
 
In the academic evaluation process, in the strictest sense, participants placed in the 
first-order process (core AR) are mere objects of research (even in the case of the 
evaluation being carried out by local practitioners, these practitioners must establish a 
clear separation between the two orders). However, this external evaluation allows 
feedback to be introduced, that of returning towards the core process in which 
academic reflection/evaluation returns to the community/organisation itself. Some 
experiences carried out in Catalonia (Spain) show that this feedback contributes to 
significant improvements in local practices: from an external, academic approach, 
Castellà & Jorba (2005) carried out an ex post evaluation of local citizen participation 
projects, whose results were returned and discussed with local practitioners. This 
debate helped them not only to reflect on their own work, but also to improve further 
practices. Thus, feedback from academia to local practices places external evaluation 
at an interesting point between quadrant D and quadrant A; in section 5 further 
considerations will be made on this issue. 
 
Regarding the quality criteria, in this model they are an academic construction, since 
the second-order process is detached from the AR practice itself, which becomes an 
external object of analysis. However, the concretion of these criteria, which is external, 
can be also dependent on the practice that is being evaluated; as Reason says (2006, 
198-199), sometimes immediate practical outcome is most important; in other practices 
priority will be given to the incorporation of weaker voices; and in others to an in-depth 
exploration of values. However, in conceptual terms, they are two different agendas: 
that of academic research and that of AR practice. For even in the case of the criteria 
being the same, the way in which they are dealt with will be different in each context: 
BASE 
KNOWLEDGE, 
FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
PLAN 
ACT 
OBSERVE 
REFLECT 
CORE 
ACTION 
RESEARCH 
ANALYSIS 
ACADEMIC 
REVIEW 
ACADEMIC 
EVALUATION 
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as a “finding” and “arrival point” as opposed to a “process” and “spiral”, as a “sanction” 
as opposed to as a “catalyst”. 
 
 
4.2. Internal, participatory evaluation of AR: From quality of AR to quality for AR 
 
The design and development of evaluation is, in this case, within the AR spiral itself, 
which involves participatory, continuous analysis and reflection. Participatory in that the 
participants define the object of the evaluation and the criteria to be evaluated (which, 
in turn, leads to collective reflection on the objectives of the process as a whole). It is 
also participatory since the participants themselves issues value judgements and 
define strategies with respect to them. And continuous, because it permits the process 
to be “recreated” during its development (evaluation is a “starting point” rather than an 
“arrival point”). In this model of “AR on AR”, evaluation is a process of social relation 
between the participants and hence, provides “in process” learning and feedback 
during all its phases. 
 
Fig. 4 Participatory Evaluation of AR as a second-order process. 
 
The epistemology of AR itself is obviously a point of reference for this process of self -
reflection on quality, in the same way as current approaches in qualitative and 
participant evaluation that are based in some way or other on the contributions of Guba 
& Lincoln (1981), Patton (1981, 2002) or Stake (1975) may also contribute to this 
debate. What these approaches have in common is that firstly, they incorporate 
participants into the evaluation process and secondly, they design strategies for 
research and reflection that are specially aimed at producing knowledge of the 
development of the process that will enable feedback, and also allow the actors to 
carry it out.  
PLAN 
ACT 
OBSERVE 
REFLECT 
CORE 
ACTION 
RESEARCH 
CRITERIA 
DEFINITION 
DATA 
OBTAINING 
DATA 
ANALYSIS 
JUDGEMENTS 
AND STRATEGIES 
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Thus, in this case, the second-order process is integrated into the first-order one, and 
both participants and practitioners/researchers are research subjects that enter into 
dialogue about the purposes, methods and results of the evaluation. The role of each 
party in this dialogue will be different, not only due to each local setting, but also to 
each AR tradition and evaluation approach: thus, O’Sullivan (2004, 8-9) describes how 
for some approaches, the participants must lead the evaluations (Fetterman 2001; 
Patton 2002), whereas others defend a more active role of the “professional 
evaluators” (Cousins & Earl 1995; O’Sullivan & O’Sullivan 1998). This debate does, in 
fact, reflect tension between different dimensions of evaluation (as learning vs as 
control; inwards vs outwards) and has been extremely creative in community 
development experiences carried out in Spain. While some practices close in on 
themselves, breaking all links with “others” (with the university, with other local 
practices) and end up “dying of success”, the experiences that have been more 
rewarding and innovative are those that have maintained an interrelation between 
internal and external reflection (e. g. with the university and/or with other local 
practices). Through this interrelation, internal, participatory evaluation, which we have 
placed in quadrant A, is intersected with B, C and D, i.e., it receives feedback from 
other evaluation approaches but without losing sight of its focus on A. We will come 
back to this in the next section. 
 
In all these cases, quality criteria are a local construction which involves dialogue with 
others. On the one hand, it involves dialogue among participants –because, as has 
already been said, defining criteria is not merely a technical issue, but also a political 
issue, and this definition involves the existing interests, conflicts and power relations 
within the setting. On the other, it involves dialogue between participants and 
researchers/practitioners –since it implies synergies between practical knowledge and 
theoretic/methodological knowledge. 
 
Based on our previous work in Spain and on a recent project of Citizenship School in 
Chile, we believe that there are two principles that help to define evaluation criteria that 
are useful to feedback processes in terms of the participants’ learning as well as the ir 
capacity to transform: transduction and stimulation. 
 
With the transduction concept that we have introduced in other texts (Villasante 2006) 
we are referring to a strategy that goes beyond, on the one hand, the rigidity of the 
deductive dynamics of analysis and evaluation (with an a priori imposition of abstract 
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theories and criteria that the participants may consider to be confining), and, on the 
other hand, the limitation to building up transforming practices based on criteria and 
conceptualisations anchored in daily routines. Transduction is, to us, a dynamic that is 
at once relational, reflective and performative and which, by introducing analysers 
(Lapassade 1971), tries to a) promote creative situations in the relationships between 
participants and local networks, b) carry out collective reflections in order to generate 
new knowledge, and c) plan transformative actions based on these movements and 
reflections. In this sense, the transductive dynamic connects with John Heron’s 
approach to validity in co-operative inquiry (Heron 1996b), and in particular his 
emphasis on relational issues as a way to overcome “uncritical subjectivity”. 
 
Secondly, we believe that the evaluation’s transforming potential is achieved through 
the construction of criteria that are “stimulating” for the actors themselves so that these 
easily see the direction for improvement. The idea of “stimulation” arises as a response 
to the attitudes frequently shown by participants towards evaluations: fear of exposing 
oneself to others, resistance to a demand from an external instutition, or simply, tedium 
when faced with tasks that are considered to be a mere administrative requirement. 
From a “stimulating” approach, the question is not so much “what the goal is and how 
we will evaluate its achievement” but rather “what we can evaluate so that it motivates 
us to make an improvement in this regard” and “how we involve ourselves in this”. We 
believe that this motivating, dynamising aspect is very important for those people who 
involve themselves in the process of change, whether they are professionals or 
volunteers. 
 
 
5. Conclusion: Intersections between models and symmetries between actors 
 
In this text, it has been argued that the evaluation of quality in AR may be conceived on 
the basis of different approaches, and this has implications for both the way it is applied 
and for defining the criteria to be evaluated. In particular, two questions have been 
introduced on which the quality debate can be based (its purposes and its audience) 
and two evaluation models of AR have been compared; academic evaluation as a form 
of external control and internal, participatory evaluation as a form of providing learning 
and change for the process. In this section, we shall make some considerations on the 
contributions and challenges of these models and on intersections between them. 
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The first model presented involves taking dialogue on AR to the academic field, a 
dialogue that is important in two respects. Firstly, for AR itself, since it promotes 
external methodological and epistemological reflection beyond the local settings. 
Secondly, for academia as a whole: by “defending” these practices in the university, AR 
challenges other methodologies as a way of producing base knowledge (Herr & 
Anderson 2005, 128). This challenge is not a purely methodological debate, as it 
entails overcoming resistance to change by the university institution itself. As 
Greenwood (2007, 259) points out: 
“Institutions like mine do not oppress or prohibit AR intentionally. Rather, they 
are unable to see the value of AR as an approach to addressing their most 
pressing internal and external problems and they do not yet feel urgent enough 
about threats to their survival to try to learn anything they do not already know” 
 
Furthermore, in this model the relation between academia and AR not only deals with 
the production of scientific knowledge, but also with how the university returns this 
knowledge to social practices. In this regard, feedback to AR projects was introduced, 
as an intersection between quadrants D-A. However, this intersection is asymmetrical 
since it is the university that lays down the rules of the game (Martí 2008, 44): criteria, 
methods and results are defined without the participants. 
 
The second model presented (internal, participatory evaluation of AR) transfers the 
dialogue to another field: movements, institutions and participants are the agents that 
define what it is and not quality and what they want to do with it. In this regard, the 
theoretical and methodological knowledge that practitioners and researchers may 
provide is made available to local actors.   
 
However, here, as in the first model, the dialogue is not symmetrical because the rules 
of the game (and the definition of the quality criteria as part of them) stem from the 
power relations that define the field. Thus, in the same way as Herr and Anderson 
(2005, 101) warn about the risks of external researchers imposing the agenda on 
participative research based on their own academic priorities, in this model we must 
take into account the perversions of the agenda being imposed by participants (or 
groups of participants) in a setting of power and conflict. 
 
In this sense, it seems relevant to think of more symmetrical spaces of relation 
between the academic reflection and local practices. Symmetrical spaces based on the 
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autonomy of each party, to discuss and transform practices. But to do this, academia 
must be able to go beyond quadrant D which, to our minds, poses two challenges. 
 
The first challenge is going from conceiving knowledge as something that must be 
“controlled” to conceiving it as a tool for learning and practice among people and 
organizations. This renunciation of control has some implications. Firstly, the 
recognition of non-academic sources of knowledge and its potential to generate a 
better understanding of reality in synergy with scientific inquiry. Secondly, and linked to 
the previous point, academia’s commitment to local practices from a relationship of true 
equality and exchange with the other actors, that is to say, giving up a sometimes 
“paternalist”, if not “advisory” role. It also involves reflecting on and making clear the 
interests that guide the different parties in an AR process (universities, public 
administrations and stakeholders, participants), the recognition of the power relations 
among actors and, based on this recognition, the shared will to create consensus. 
 
The second challenge for academia is conceiving knowledge not only as the analysis 
of the present but also as a generator of possible futures. We think that the contribution 
of Santos (2002, 2003) regarding the “sociology of emergencies” may shed 
considerable light in this respect. For Santos, reality must be considered as a field of 
not only experience but also possibility and, within this context, the role of critical 
analysis consists of exploring the nature and the range of alternatives to that which is 
empirically given (Santos 2003, 23).  
 
We believe that it is within this context where the key AR issues and their evaluation 
can be carried out more fully.  
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